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Information asymmetry and Accounting Conservatism under IFRS Adoption
Abstract: LaFond and Watts (2008) provide evidence that information asymmetry
might be a determinant of accounting conservatism. One implication of their paper is
that regulators trying to reduce information asymmetry by lowering the level of
accounting conservatism might be wrong. However, there is a trend in moving away
from conservative accounting. The typical example is IFRS adoption. Therefore, this
paper studies information asymmetry and accounting conservatism under IFRS
adoption. The results show that the level of accounting conservatism decreases after
mandatory IFRS adoption, but the adoption of IFRS is likely to weaken the
relationship between information asymmetry and accounting conservatism. Moreover,
this paper investigates how the change of accounting conservatism under IFRS is
related to the change in information environment. The finding shows that accounting
conservatism increases information environment, supporting the idea that, by
providing comparatively credible information, conservative accounting is beneficial
to the information environment.
Keywords: information asymmetry; accounting conservatism; IFRS.
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11. Introduction
Conservatism is a traditional measure of the profits by recording the losses
immediately and the gains after the realization. Basu (1997) interprets conservatism
as accountants’ tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good
news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses. The long term result of
accounting conservatism is an understatement of net assets. LaFond and Watts (2008)
have shown the relationship between information asymmetry and accounting
conservatism. The primary research objective of my paper is to extend LaFond and
Watts (2008) study by investigating the change in the level of conservatism after
mandatory IFRS adoption, and the effect of IFRS on this relationship. There is also an
argument mentioned by LaFond and Watts that conservative accounting is beneficial
to the information environment. However, this was not been tested. Therefore, the
second research objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between
accounting conservatism and information environment.
Conservatism exists in financial reports (Dechow et al., 1999; Beaver and Ryan,
2000; Basu, 1997; Givoly and Hayn, 2000). Researchers have proposed four
explanations for conservative accounting: contracting, litigation, regulation, and
taxation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Ball, 1989; Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003).
Recently, LaFond and Watts (2008) investigate the relationship between information
asymmetry and conservatism. Their study sheds lights on the view that information
asymmetry might be another important determinant of conservatism. They also
provide evidence that the effect of information asymmetry on conservatism exists
after controlling for contracting and litigation effects. This implies that the effect of
information asymmetry on conservatism cannot be attributed to other potential
sources of conservatism. If there are no correlated omitted variables in their tests, one
crucial implication of their paper is that the aim of accounting standard setters trying
to reduce information asymmetry by lowering the level of accounting conservatism in
financial statements might not by be achieved. However, there is a trend in financial
reporting standards which is moving away from conservative accounting to fair value
accounting. The most typical example is the wide adoption of IFRS around the world.
2According to the IFRS website, there are approximately 120 nations and reporting
jurisdictions which permit or require IFRS for domestic listed companies. In the
literature, to date, most papers focused on documenting the change of economic
consequences of IFRS adoption, such as cost of capital, comparability, and
accounting relevance. However, few papers have investigated the level of information
asymmetry after IFRS adoption and there is even fewer empirical evidences
investigating the change in conservatism after IFRS adoption. Therefore, in order to
fill up this gap in the literature, my paper investigates information asymmetry and
accounting conservatism under IFRS adoption.
In LaFond and Watts (2008) paper, they also argue that conservative financial
reports are likely to generate a more informed capital market than financial reports
that include more unverifiable information. However, what constitutes an informed
capital market has not been carefully defined and, also, this implication is not tested
in their paper. Hu and Zhang (2011) extend LaFond and Watts (2008) by using Basu
(1997) model to capture accounting conservatism and firm-specific return volatility to
proxy for informed capital market. Their paper mainly focuses on informativeness of
stock price. They calculate their measure of firm-specific return volatility using data
based on an expanded market model given in Jin and Myers (2006). Finally, they
document that information environment is positively associated with accounting
conservatism in their international dataset. I define an informed capital market as an
analyst information environment which is different from Hu and Zhang (2011). In the
prior literature, numerous studies use the characteristics of analyst forecasts as a
proxy for the information environment (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Gebhardt et al.,
2001; Lang et al., 2003). Consistent with them, I am able to investigate the
relationship between accounting conservatism and information environment. After
mandatory IFRS adoption, which provides a good setting to examine this research
issue, firms are more flexible in choosing accounting methods than before, because
IFRS was supposed to reduce accounting discretion and improve uniformity. Related
parties, such as debt-holders, shareholders, and analysts might change their attitudes
towards accounting numbers presented in financial statements and, thus, alter the
requirement for conservatism. For example, after IFRS adoption, if debt-holders
3anticipate that the accounting numbers become less credible, they will set up more
stringent requirements in debt contracts, such as higher net asset, to compensate for
the loss in accounting credibility. If this is the case, then, the capital market after
mandatory IFRS adoption is actually less informed.
Different from mandatory IFRS adoption firms (on-time or late IFRS adopters)
which are expected to be more conservative in accounting before, early IFRS adopters
might not experience a significant change in the relationship between conservatism
and information asymmetry. There are two reasons. First, even though these firms are
standing outside of main stream in the economy before mandatory adoption, they are
leaders in the industry after mandatory IFRS adoption with an established accounting
record of IFRS numbers. Analysts can directly evaluate accounting numbers of these
firms. However, mandatory adoption firms still need more time to fully understand
IFRS and get used to reporting under IFRS. This might hinder analysts’ evaluation
referring to accounting numbers. Second, early IFRS adopters have already fully
taken the benefits and costs into consideration before voluntarily adopting IFRS, and,
thus, the conservatism of early adoption firms might not change during the IFRS
transition period. Consequently, even though the mandatory IFRS adoption might
exert influence on conservatism, the level of accounting conservatism of early
adoption firms is expected to be remained the same.
I focus on a sample of European countries which required mandatory adoption
of IFRS after 2005. The goal of IFRS is to improve financial reporting internationally,
increase the comparability, reducing information asymmetry and reduce cost of
capital. To some level, the standard-setters are trying to reduce information
asymmetry between firms and outside investors by incorporating more unverified
value into financial reports. However, since conservatism is a simple response to the
change of information asymmetry (LaFond and Watts, 2008), trying to reduce
information asymmetry through lowering conservatism might not be effective.
Nevertheless, there are papers indirectly documenting a lower level of information
asymmetry after mandatory IFRS adoption (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001; Wang et al.,
2007; Daske et al., 2008; Armstrong et al., 2010; Li, 2010). These studies do not
4violate the findings of LaFond and Watts (2008), because firms still can benefit from
IFRS adoption from other sources, such as higher comparability which will lower
information asymmetry. In my paper, in order to focus only on the role of
conservatism, I investigate the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the relationship
between information asymmetry and conservatism. In addition, I also expect
European countries mandatorily adopting IFRS after 2005 to be a worthwhile setting
to investigate, because this is a significant change in IFRS adoption history. Moreover,
the extant empirical literature investigating the economic consequences after
mandatory IFRS adoption is unclear. Further, the mandatory IFRS adoption setting
provides an explicit cutoff date, using which I can separate the data and analyze the
situation before and after IFRS adoption.
Following Basu (1997), I use the asymmetric timeliness of gain and loss
recognition to measure accounting conservatism. Following Lang et al. (2003), I use
the characteristics of analyst forecasts as a proxy for the information environment.
Specifically, I consider how forecast accuracy and analyst following during the period
around the mandatory adoption of IFRS in Europe. I assess the robustness of my
results by using C_Score (Khan and Watts, 2009). It is a measure of accounting
conservatism at the firm-year level. Also, I provide evidence that this measure is valid
in European countries setting, because it can effectively distinguish firms with
different level of conservatism.
My study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, despite the
large literature on accounting conservatism, few studies have investigated the effect
of IFRS on relationship between information asymmetry and conservatism. Using
Basu coefficients, LaFond and Watts (2008) find that information asymmetry is
positively associated with conservatism and, also, it is information asymmetry leads
to conservatism. Piot et al. (2010) examine the change of conditional conservatism
after IFRS adoption. They find that conditional conservatism, as measured by the
asymmetric timeliness of bad vs. good news, has decreased under IFRS, notably
among Big 4 audits. Unlike those studies, my paper concentrates on the effect of
IFRS on the relationship between information asymmetry and conservatism. This
5means I provide a new view by taking information asymmetry, conservatism and
IFRS into consideration simultaneously.
Second, this paper makes contribution to the literature on analyst’s information
environment after IFRS adoption. Horton and Serafeim (2010) examine the effect of
mandatory IFRS on firms’ information environment and find that the improvement is
limited to non-financial firms that mandatorily adopt IFRS. My paper further studies
the impact of conservatism on analyst’s information environment after IFRS adoption,
expanding and shedding lights on literature by linking conservatism which is an
important feature of accounting information to analyst’s information environment.
Third, my paper also contributes to the literature on economic consequences of
IFRS adoption. In prior literature, the effect of IFRS adoption is mixed. On one hand,
researchers find that there is a decrease in information asymmetry and cost of capital
after IFRS adoption. Daske et al. (2008) document a decrease in firms’ cost of capital
and an increase in equity valuation in countries with strong legal enforcement. Li
(2010) finds a decrease in cost of capital in mandatory IFRS adoption case. However,
on the other hand, Soderstrom and Sun (2007) argues that cross-country differences in
accounting quality are likely to remain following IFRS adoption. My paper
investigates effect of IFRS on information asymmetry and conservatism, adding
evidence on economic consequences of IFRS adoption.
Finally, this paper also has important regulatory implication to countries
concerning mandatory IFRS adoption. LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that more
conservative accounting is likely to generate more informed capital market. IFRS,
which incorporates more fair value into financial statement, contradicts their
argument. This paper examines the effect of conservatism on information
environment after IFRS adoption, which has significant implication to standard-
setters and countries considering IFRS adoption.
62. Literature Review
Conservatism’s influence on accounting practice has been long and significant
(Watts, 2003). Although there is a trend in moving from conservative accounting to
fair value accounting, conservatism still cannot be eliminated. The survival of
conservatism suggests that it has its own benefits. If regulators and standard-setters
ignore its benefits and try to eliminate conservatism without fully understanding these
benefits, the resultant standards are likely to damage the role of accounting as an
information source (Khan and Watts, 2009).
2.1 Explanations for Conservatism
In the literature, there are four traditional alternate explanations for
conservatism: contracting, litigation, taxation, and accounting regulation. There are
also several non-conservatism explanations for asymmetric timeliness or asymmetric
earnings response coefficients, such as financial options (Dhaliwa et al., 1991;
Fischer and Verrecchia, 1997; Core and Schrand, 1999; Plummer and Tse, 1999),
adaptation option (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997), real option (Christophe, 2002),
earnings management (Hanna, 2002) and abandonment option (Hayn, 1995), that
provide some level of evidence on conservatism, but cannot be the major explanations
(Watts, 2003).
Contracting is an early explanation for conservatism. Its arguments are fully
developed. Under the contracting explanation, conservative accounting is used as a
tool to mitigate the moral hazard problem generated by asymmetric information,
asymmetric payoffs, limited horizons and limited liability. Firms enter into many
contracts. Two particularly important contracts are debt contracts between the firm
and its debt-holders and executive compensation contracts between the firm and its
managers. From the debt contracts perspective, debt-holders are more concerned on
verifiable lower bound of the current value of net assets because the potential
unverifiable gains of net assets do not add additional benefits. However, if the firm
cannot guarantee enough net assets to cover the payments to debtholders, because of
limited liability, lenders might have to receive less than promised. Therefore, debt-
7holders demand verifiable loss recognition to assure the minimum amount of net
assets exceeds the dollar amounts of debt contracts. Nikolaev (2010) uses a sample of
over 5,000 debt issues and finds evidence that reliance on covenants in public debt
contracts is positively related with the degree of timely loss recognition. Beatty et al.,
(2008) also document a positive relationship between debt contract and the degree of
timely loss recognition. This indicates that debtholders would prefer to use covenants
to protect their own benefits under conservative accounting.
From compensation contracts perspective, managers have incentives to
introduce bias and noise to accounting measures, because compensation package is
partially based on accounting numbers. Conservatism constrains managerial
opportunistic behavior and managerial biases with timely loss recognition and
delaying gain recognition. On one hand, in order to maximize their benefits, managers
are motivated to release information of potential gains in the future. On the other
hand, conservatism assures the disclosure of losses which managers would like to
hide. Basu(1997), Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006) and Kothari et al. (2005)
explicitly address the role of accruals in asymmetrically timely loss recognition. In
both debt contracts and compensation contracts, conservatism is regarded as an
efficient corporate governance mechanism to mitigate agency costs by providing
timely loss signals. Debtholders and shareholders can use conservative accounting to
protect their benefits. Consequently, contracting is one of the explanations of
conservatism in financial reports.
Litigation explanation asserts that, since firms are more likely to be sued if they
overstate net assets than understate net assets (Kellogg, 1984; St. Pierre and Anderson,
1984), management and auditors have incentives to report conservative earnings and
net asset values. Taxation explanation indicates that delaying the recognition of
revenue and accelerating the recognition of expense enable managers of profitable
firms to reduce taxes and increase the value of firm. Therefore, they have incentives
to adopt conservative accounting. Similar to the taxation explanation, regulation
explanation claims that regulators might face more criticism if firms overstate net
8assets than if they understate net assets. Thus, in order to reduce political costs,
standard-setters and regulators demand unconditional conservatism.
The above four factors (Watts, 2003a) that drive conservatism can be viewed as
four sources of demands for accounting conservatism. Empirical evidences on the
relation between conservatism and contracting and litigation explanations are more
frequent in the literature. There are limited studies that illustrate the taxation and
regulation explanations. Using the Basu (1997) regression model, Francis and Martin
(2010) find that the positive association between timely loss recognition and
acquisition profitability is more pronounced for firms with higher agency costs. Park
and Wynn (2008) also provide evidence. This is consistent with contracting
explanation. LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) provide evidence that financial
reporting conservatism is one potential mechanism to address agency problems
between managers and shareholders, which imply economic demand for
conservatism. By classifying conservatism into conditional and unconditional, Qiang
(2007) directly test the four factors and finds that contracting only induces conditional
conservatism; taxation and regulation only induces unconditional conservatism;
litigation induces both. Drawing on sample of Spanish firms, Cano-Rodriguez (2010)
concludes that large accounting firms promote conditional conservatism, thereby
increasing the contracting efficiency of their clients’ accounting information. His
study indicates that large accounting firms also demand for conservative accounting.
More recently, LaFond and Watts (2008) provide evidence that information
asymmetry generates conservatism. Since contracting explanation is somewhat
related to information asymmetry, they control the impact of contracting and
litigation explanations to find a significant association. This means information
asymmetry captures something other than traditional sources of conservatism,
shedding lights on new determinants of conservative accounting. They also highlight
the long existence of conservatism. However, empirical studies testing information
asymmetry as a source of conservatism is limited. The only exception is LaFond and
Watts (2008) using U.S. data. One of the important implications of LaFond and Watts
(2008) paper is that if the regulates ignore this causal relationship, their attempt to
9decrease information asymmetry by lowering the level of conservatism, incorporating
more unverifiable value in financial reports might not be achieved. IFRS adoption is a
typical example of moving away from conservative accounting, aiming at reducing
information asymmetry which is opposite to LaFond and Watts predicted relationship.
Therefore, I expect the IFRS adoption will induce a corresponding change in the level
of conservatism and exert influence on the relationship between information
asymmetry and conservatism. My paper will add value to the literature from this point
of view.
2.2 Conservatism Measure
A number of measures of conservatism have been used in the conservatism
literature. Wang et al. (2009) summarize five key measures of accounting
conservatism. They are Basu’s (1997) asymmetric timeliness of earnings measure,
Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) asymmetric-cash-flow-to-accruals measure, the
Market-to-Book ratio, Penman and Zhang’s (2002) hidden-reserves measure, and
Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) negative-accruals measure.
Basu coefficient is the most widely used measure of accounting conservatism
in the prior literature (Ryan, 2006; Wang et al., 2009). Wang et al. (2009) test the
validity of five measures mentioned above under a construct validity perspective,
addressing the question of inconsistency among these measures. They present a
survey reviewing papers which adopt measures of conservatism that have been widely
applied and have been published in journals through to May 2009. The frequency
table in their paper shows that Basu coefficient measure is by far the most frequently
used measure for conservatism in the literature. Because of the extensive use of Basu
coefficient, there are also plenty of critics towards it. Ryan (2006) point out that bad
news as losses might not be reflected in earnings in a timely manner because of buffer
problems in GAAP. Watts (2003) argues that certain economic events which are
unrelated to conservatism will generate asymmetric timeliness of gain and loss
recognition. Hanna (2003) identified several types of discretionary accounting
behavior which might also affect asymmetric timeliness of gain and loss recognition.
Givoly et al., (2006) argues that there is a little time-series consistency in estimates of
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asymmetric timeliness at the firm level. Despite of limitations, Ryan (2006) still
argues that Basu coefficient is the most direct implication of conditional conservatism
in asymmetric timeliness, comparing it with the measures suggested by Dietrich et al.
(2007).
M/B ratio and negative accruals measure are the second and third used
measure of accounting conservatism. Although Dietrich et al. (2007) suggest using
them instead of Basu coefficient, which contains bias, to capture conservatism, Ryan
(2006) strongly argues against their view and point out that these two measures are
assessing the overall conservatism instead of conditional conservatism. Moreover,
these measures are likely to be driven by unconditional conservatism. Therefore, they
are likely not useful for measuring conditional conservatism unless the effect of
conditional and unconditional conservatism can be separated. However, a key
advantage of using M/B ratio to measure conservatism is that this measure is strongly
rooted in the analytical work based on Residual Income Valuation Model (Feltham
and Ohlson, 1995), which is one of the valuation models only under extremely
simplistic and unrealistic assumptions in the accounting literature (Lo and Lys, 2002;
Callen and Morel, 2002). But, using M/B ratio might have confounding problems,
because it is also a well-known proxy for many factors other than accounting
conservatism in accounting and finance literature, such as it is used to proxy for
default risk in finance literature and growth in accounting literature, which is identical
to conservatism in the Ohlson model.
Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) compare Basu coefficient and M/B ratio as
measures of conservatism and investigate the relationship between these two proxies
to address the question on the validity of asymmetric timeliness as an empirical
measure of conservatism. An important basis for the question is the observed negative
correlation between the Basu measure and M/B ratio. There are major two
explanations for the negative correlation. First, theoretically, the benchmark for
conservatism is separable net assets and changes in separable net assets by rents and
changes in growth option. However, M/B and Basu coefficient assume this
benchmark as equity value and changes in equity value. Thus, both M/B and the Basu
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coefficient measures of conservatism have errors. Second, they argue that the
negative relationship is due to time horizons used in empirical research. When using
short time horizon, Basu coefficient might fail to recognize gains that increase M/B
and serve as a buffer problem. Nevertheless, Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) paper
also asserts that the Basu coefficient is a better measure of conservatism because any
noise introduced by growth options changes should be mitigate over long horizons
(Basu, 1997; Pope and Walker, 1999; Ball et al., 2000). In summary, despite of critics,
the Basu coefficient remained as the major measure of conditional conservatism.
However, one disadvantage of Basu coefficient is that it cannot make firm-
specific measurements. In particular, the Basu (1997) coefficient has to be estimated
either on an annual basis using a cross-section of observations or on a firm-specific
basis using time-series observations. Both estimation methods have limitations. The
former method assumes all firms in the industry are homogeneous and the latter
method assumes that the firm’s operating characteristics are stationary. Khan and
Watts (2009) develop a conservatism measure, C_Score, based on Basu (1997)
regression model, incorporating firm-specific characteristics. C_Score can reflect the
timing of conservatism changes and the variation of conservatism across firms within
an industry.
C_Score has several advantages. First, it can reflect both time- and firm-
specific changes affecting firm’s financial reporting conservatism, such as a change in
the information asymmetry caused by a firm-specific reduction in growth
opportunities (LaFond and Watts, 2008). Second, it can be estimated for firms that
only have positive returns, which the Basu coefficient cannot. This implies using
C_Score can enlarge sample size in conservatism studies. Third, introducing three
firm-specific variables, it captures the four explanations- contracting, litigation,
taxation and regulation- that drive conservatism as a whole. Although C_Score has
advantages stated before, it has not been widely used to measure conservatism so far.
Therefore, this paper uses both Basu coefficients as major test and C_Score for robust
check the main hypothesis.
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3. Institutional setting
International Financial Report Standards (IFRS) will likely eventually be
adopted by countries all around the world. According to the IFRS website,
approximately 120 nations and reporting jurisdictions permit or require IFRS for
domestic listed companies. Although 90 countries have fully conformed to IFRS and
include a statement acknowledging such conformity in audit reports, some other
countries including Korea is expected to transition to IFRS by 2011; Mexico will
require IFRS for all listed companies in 2012; Japan has been considering the
adoption of IFRS.1 United States is also considering a timeline of transition to IFRS
for firms that want to start reporting under IFRS. In recent years, IASB has continued
to take steps to extend the application of IFRS adoption.
The European Union required publicly listed companies to present consolidated
financial statements consistent with IFRS for each financial year starting after 1
January 2005 (EC Regulation No. 1606/2002). While mandatory IFRS adoption is
required after 2005, there are still exemptions. For example, Swiss firms that are not
multinationals are exempt from IFRS reporting. These companies may continue to
use Swiss GAAP, or they can choose between IFRS or US GAAP (Deloitte, 2008).
These firms which are not reporting under IFRS are excluded in my study. Firms that
are reporting under IFRS can be divided into two groups. Voluntary adopters include
all firms that adopted IFRS before 2005, while mandatory adopters include firms
forced by EU to adopt IFRS.
The economic consequences after mandatory IFRS adoption are still unclear.
Standard-setters claim that the adoption of IFRS has the ability to reduce the
information asymmetry, increase comparability, and, thus, decrease cost of capital by
providing comparatively more reliable estimation about future cash flows, making
financial statement more useful to investors. Daske et al. (2008) report an increase in
earnings quality for a sample of firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS. Li (2010) provides
1 IFRS FAQ. (n.d.) How widespread is the adoption of IFRS around the world. Retrieved December 16, 2010,
from http://www.ifrs.com/ifrs_faqs.html#q3.
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evidence that the significant drop in cost of capital still exists under mandatory IFRS
adoption. Armstrong et al. (2010) document an incrementally positive reaction for
firms with lower pre-adoption information and with higher pre-adoption information
asymmetry. Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) consider IFRS as a high quality set of
standards providing valuable information to investors. Wang et al. (2007) examine the
effect of mandatory IFRS adoption, and find that there is a significant decrease in
earnings forecast errors. Another argument in favor of mandatory IFRS adoption is
that the global movement towards IFRS creates a set of worldwide accounting
standards, making it easier for foreign investors interpreting firms’ financial
statements and, thus, lowering related cost (Andre and Filip, 2012).
However, there are also plenty of criticisms towards the mandatory adoption of
IFRS, which is considered as a set of fair-value oriented and comprehensive
accounting standards than most local GAAP in Europe. Ries and Stocken (2007) as
well as Dye and Sunder (2001) find that even though the informativeness of a report
using fair value completely reveals a firm’s inventory holdings, difficulties of
implementing fair value measurements hamper this ability. Moreover, the financial
crisis in 2008 sounded the alarm to standard setters and has led to a vigorous debate
about the pros and cons of fair value accounting. Khan (2010) finds that fair value
reporting is associated with an increase in systemic risk2 in banking industry. In
addition, LaFond and Watts (2008) argue for a causation relationship between
information asymmetry and conservatism. They argue that standard-setters who are
trying to reduce information asymmetry and increase transparency by incorporating
more unverifiable values might not achieve their goal. Consequently, mandating the
use of IFRS may not make financial reports more comparable or more informative,
suggesting that the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption can be small
or negligible. As different views stated above, the capital market reaction towards
mandatory IFRS adoption remains as an important empirical issue.
2 Systemic risk is the risk or probability of breakdowns in an entire system, as opposed to breakdowns in
individual parts or components (Kaufman and Scott, 2000).
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4. Hypotheses
It is unclear how accounting conservatism will change after the mandatory
adoption of IFRS, which is a allegedly principle-based accounting method. It is
possible that conservatism will decrease if, for example, investors expect higher
financial reporting quality than original domestic standards after mandatory adoption
of IFRS, thereby enhancing financial reporting transparency, reducing information
asymmetry and information risk and, thus, lowering cost of capital. Accounting
conservatism will decrease since information asymmetry and conservatism is
positively associated (LaFond and Watts, 2008). This prediction is supported by prior
research. For example, Armstrong et.al (2010) finds that investors react positively to
firms with lower pre-adoption information quality, especially to banks when they
adopt IFRS. Their findings are consistent with view that mandatory adoption of IFRS
will mitigate information asymmetry. Similarly, Brochet et.al (2011) finds that private
information reduces following IFRS adoption because of the increases in
comparability. Daske et al. (2008) also provide early evidence on economic
consequences after mandatory IFRS adoption. They document, on average, a decrease
in firms’ cost of capital and an increase in equity valuation in countries where firms
have incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is strong. Using Basu
coefficients, Piots et al. (2010) finds that conditional conservatism has decreased
under IFRS, particularly among Big 4 audit firms.
However, it is also possible that accounting conservatism may increase after
mandatory IFRS adoption if, for example, investors expect accounting numbers to be
less verifiable. The credibility which is the most important characteristics of
accounting playing as a role of information source comparing with other information
sources, such as press or media, decreases. Therefore, investors will require higher
rate of return, enhancing cost of capital. In addition, information asymmetry will
increase if investors anticipate more earnings management. IFRS are principle-based
standards with minimal implementation guidance. After the adoption of IFRS, firms
are more flexible in choosing accounting estimates methods and, thus, it is reasonable
for investors to anticipate that managers will prefer accounting methods giving them
15
more room to manage earnings. If this is the case, then, from managers’ perspective,
they have incentives to make the reported financial statement seem credible by
choosing conservative accounting methods and, thus, enhance conservatism. LaFond
and Watts (2008) argue that incorporating more fair value into financial statements,
such as an increase in growth options, will generate an increase in information
asymmetry and accounting conservatism. Ahmed et al. (2010) conclude that
mandatory IFRS adoption will lower accounting quality, resulting in smoother
earnings, more aggressive reporting of accruals, and a reduction in timeliness of loss
recognition relative to gain recognition. Despite of concentrating on only three
countries, namely Australia, France and UK, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) find that
earnings management did not decline after IFRS adoption and even increased in
France. Examining earnings management and timely loss recognition, Christensen et
al. (2009) finds that accounting quality improvement after IFRS adoption are
confined to firms with incentives to adopt and concludes that incentives are the most
essential element on accounting standards in determining accounting quality. This
indicates the change of earnings quality under mandatory IFRS adoption is still
unclear.  Accordingly, we hypothesize the following:
H1: The accounting conservatism changes after mandatory IFRS adoption.
I test this hypothesis in two parts:
H1a: The accounting conservatism increases after mandatory IFRS adoption.
H1b: The accounting conservatism decreases after mandatory IFRS adoption.
Mandatory IFRS adoption is a regulatory change in accounting standards. In
hypothesis H1, I expect a change in conservatism after mandatory IFRS adoption, no
matter increases or decreases. The next question is what drives this change of
conservatism. One possible reason is that parties closely related to or using
accounting numbers might respond correspondently to this change and, therefore,
generate a change in their demands for accounting conservatism. There are four
traditional explanations, contracting, litigation, taxation, and regulation, which are
mentioned before as a whole, because there is reason to believe that these four factors
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are not independent (Watts, 2003b). Moreover, on the base of Basu coefficient,
C_Score adds three more variables-M/B, size and leverage-that are widely available
and commonly used as proxies for the firm’s investment opportunity set (IOS) which
lead to the change of four factors.
Another possible reason that might explain the change of conservatism after
mandatory IFRS adoption is the change in information asymmetry. LaFond and Watts
(2008) argue that information asymmetry between firm insiders and outside investors
generates conservatism in financial statements. This implies that information
asymmetry might be another determinant of conservatism. Generally speaking, more
unverifiable current value of future cash flow will be estimated and shown in the
financial statements (Piot et al., 2010). For example, IFRS requires the recognition of
in-house intangible assets, while it remains optional under continental national
GAAP. The more unverifiable items are included, the higher level of information
asymmetry between managers and outside investors. If this is the case, then, the
change of accounting conservatism after IFRS adoption might be the result of change
in information asymmetry. Further, LaFond and Watts (2008) document a positive
relationship between information asymmetry and conservatism. Consequently, I
hypothesize the following:
H2: The change of accounting conservatism after IFRS adoption is positively
related to the change in information asymmetry.
If I find information asymmetry is the significantly driver for the change in
conservatism after mandatory IFRS adoption, then, what is the specific effect of IFRS
on the relationship between information asymmetry and conservatism? On one hand,
mandatory IFRS adoption might strengthen the relationship between them. IFRS,
which is a principle-based accounting standard, require firms to incorporate more fair
value into financial statements, especially the change in goodwill, research and
development expenses (R&D), and asset revaluation (Aharony et al., 2010). This
suggests that accounting number will be less reliable, because of recognizing more
unverifiable gains. Also, more opportunistic earnings management will be expected.
Given this case, debt-holders, share holders, and auditors are more eager for
17
conservative accounting. Therefore, in this sense, mandatory adoption of IFRS
strengthens the association between information asymmetry and conservatism.
However, it is also possible that the relationship is weakened by IFRS adoption,
because related parties might turn to other information sources for help, such as
increasing option-based compensation and decreasing earnings-based compensation.
Accordingly, I hypothesize the following:
H3a: The IFRS adoption strengthens the relationship between information
asymmetry and conservatism.
H3b: The IFRS adoption weakens the relationship between information
asymmetry and conservatism.
LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that conservative financial reports are likely to
generate a more informed capital market than financial reports that include
unverifiable information. This means accounting conservatism is positively related
with the information environment. Although accounting cannot reduce information
asymmetry by providing more unverified information, conservative accounting still
can benefit the information environment between equity investors through other ways.
On one hand, conservative accounting provides hard information on firms’ current
performance. High verification criteria of gains and low verification criteria of losses
is likely to limit manager’s tendency of overstating unverifiable gains and
understating losses, making the gains and losses presented in financial statements
credible. Thus, conservative accounting can facilitate the flow of information and
result in a better information environment. On the other hand, conservative
accounting serves as a bench-mark for other information sources. If there is potential
gains affecting future cash flow but are not allowed to be recorded in financial
statement according to accounting standards, managers have incentives to release
those good news through other information sources, such as manager comments or
press release. Conservative accounting can discipline other sources of information
(Watts, 2006). Equity investors can compare other sources of information to the
conservative financial statement information, evaluating information reliably. Thus,
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as a bench-mark, conservative accounting may result in a better information
environment.
IFRS adoption, which is moving away from conservative accounting, indicates
lowering the verification criteria of gains, incorporating more unverifiable
information in financial statements, and, thus, making accounting information more
unreliable. Since I expect a change in the level of conservatism after mandatory IFRS
adoption, there might associate a change of information environment in European
countries in the same direction. Consequently, I hypothesize the following:
H4: The conservatism is positively related to firms’ information environment
under IFRS adoption.
5. Research design
5.1 Conservatism Measure
First, I run Basu(1997) model to get Basu coefficients on pooled data and,
then, on three groups of firms separated by by IFRS adoption timing- early, on-time,
and late.
Second, I use C_Score (Khan and Watts, 2009) to proxy accounting
conservatism. Empirical evidence related to application of C_Score is limited. Khan
and Watts (2009) demonstrate the validity of C_Score by using U.S. data. Lai and
Taylor (2008) provide evidence that conservatism, measured by C_Score, is a
pervasive attribute of financial reporting under Australian GAAP. Specifically, I first
estimate C_Score for each firm per year by using the following equation:
, / , = + , + , ( + , + / , + , ) +, , ( + , + / , + , ) + ( , + / , +, + , + , / , + , , ) + , (1)
where X is earnings per share; P is year-end stock price per share; R is the return on
firm I from 9 months before fiscal year-end t to 3 months after fiscal year-end t, total
12-month return; D is a dummy variable that equals 1 if R is negative and 0
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otherwise; Size is the natural logarithm of market value of equity at the end of year;
M/B is market-to-book ratio; Lev is leverage ratio that is defined as the sum of short-
term and long-term debt divided by market value of equity at the end of year. Fama-
MacBeth regression estimates Equation (1), yielding λ to λ . Then, I can calculate
C_Score for each firm-year as Equation (2)_ , = + , + ⁄ , + , (2)
where Size is the natural logarithm of market value of equity; M/B is market-to-book
ratio; Lev is leverage ratio, defined as the sum of short-term and long-term debt
divided by market value of equity. Four factors that drive conservatism vary with
firm’s investment opportunity set (IOS). Therefore, instead of measuring the
individual effects of the four factors, Khan and Watts (2009) use three firm-specific
variables- size, M/B and leverage- to capture variation in IOS which vary with four
factors. In my study, I consider all the four factors as a whole.
In Equation (1), the coefficients λ , λ , λ , λ are used to calculate C_Score in
Equation (2). Then, I average the C_Score for each year and plot them to see the
moving trend of the level of accounting conservatism after mandatory IFRS adoption.
According to Hypothesis 1, I expected a change after 2005, which means the
accounting conservatism is affected by the adoption of IFRS. However, the direction
is unknown. It may increase (H1a) or decrease (H1b).
One thing might be noticed is that C_Score is motivated from the four
determinants (contracts, litigation, taxation, regulation) of conservatism in the U.S.
Khan and Watts (2009) caution that it might not be an appropriate conservatism
measure in studies using data from countries where the institutional features differ
from U.S. institutional features in important ways, such as countries with a weak legal
enforcement regime. To address this concern, I plan to examine whether C_Score can
effectively distinguish firms with different levels of conservatism consistent with
other commonly used conservatism measure, basically the Basu (1997) coefficients.
In addition, Givoly et al. (2007) examine the power and reliability of the Basu
coefficient. They identify three certain characteristics of the information environment
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unrelated to conservatism that affect the Basu coefficient. They are aggregation effect,
nature of the economic events effect, and disclosure policy effect. Thus, they suggest
that we can’t rely on any single measure to assess the overall conservatism (Gigler
and Hemmer, 2001). This is also the reason that my paper includes two different
measures of conservatism---the Basu coefficient, and C_Score, even though C_Score
is developed from the Basu model.
I estimate the Basu (1997) regression again on the pooled data but with three
levels of C_Score groups- low, median, and high C_Score groups. Then, the
following regression is estimated for each group.
, / , = + , + , + , , + , (3)
where X/P is earnings scaled by lagged price; R is the return on firm I from 9 months
before fiscal year-end t to 3 months after fiscal year-end t, total 12-month return on;
D is a dummy variable equal to 1 if returns are negative, and 0 elsewhere. refers to
the Basu coefficients for good news. measures the level of conservatism. If I figure
out that the Basu coefficients from the regression increase with C_Score groups, I can
conclude that the C_Score measure is effective in distinguishing between firms in
European countries with different levels of conservatism based on the Basu
conservatism measure. In my paper, I will only calculate the Basu coefficients under
fiscal period returns. Despite Basu tests a number of other specifications in his paper,
all of them come up with similar results. Therefore, I will only compare C_Score with
the Basu coefficients under fiscal period returns. One thing worth to notice when
using Basu coefficients is the buffer problem which causes the annual Basu
coefficients to understate the degree of conservatism. However, the buffer problem
can be released by using long horizon to estimate asymmetric timeliness (Basu, 1997).
5.2 Information asymmetry measure (Bid-Ask spread)
I use bid-ask spread to test the changes of information asymmetry after
mandatory adoption of IFRS. In accounting prior literature, bid-ask spread is a
commonly used proxy for information asymmetry (Welker, 1995; Healy et al., 1999;
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Leuz et al., 2000; Daske et al., 2008). It measures the information asymmetry
between inside and outside investors in trading markets. I obtain the daily closing bid
and ask prices for each day from IBES and compute the daily spread as the difference
between bid price and ask price. The bid-ask spread for a firm-year is the average of
the daily spreads for that firm-year and, then, scaled by the midpoint of the spread.
Hypotheses 2 investigate the positive relationship between information
asymmetry and accounting conservatism. I test the hypotheses by following equation:
, ,⁄ = + , + , + , , + ⁄ , + ⁄ , ,+ ⁄ , , + ⁄ , , , + , (4)
where Size, M/B, and Lev as defined before; Bid/Ask represents the level of
information asymmetry after mandatory IFRS adoption. Coefficient β is expected to
be positive, because the information asymmetry and conservatism change in the same
direction (LaFond and Watts, 2008).
I test the effect of IFRS on the relationship between information asymmetry and
conservatism (H3) by following regression.
, ,⁄ =+ , + , + , , + ⁄ , + ⁄ , , +⁄ , , + ⁄ , , , + , + , , +, , + , , , + , ⁄ , +, ⁄ , , + , ⁄ , , +, ⁄ , , , + , (5)
where X/P is earnings scaled by lagged price; R is the 12-month fiscal return on firm
i; D is a dummy variable equal to 1 if returns are negative, and 0 elsewhere; Bid/Ask
represents the level of information asymmetry after mandatory IFRS adoption.
According to Hypothesis 3, the sign of coefficient β can be positive (H3a) or
negative (H3b).
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5.3 Information environment and conservatism
Prior research by Gebhardt et al. (2001) and Lang et al. (2003) uses the
characteristics of analyst forecasts as a proxy for the information environment.
Houston et al. (2006) provide evidence that greater coverage by analysts is negatively
related to information asymmetry between firms and investors. Consequently, it has
been used to proxy for a firm’s information environment. Consistent with prior
literature, I also use analyst variables- the accuracy of analyst forecasts and the
number of analysts following the firm, as indicative of changes in a firm’s
information environment.
To investigate the effect of conservatism on information environment, I test the
differences in analyst variables before and after mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005 for
all firms. Consequently, I generate the following equation:IE , = γ + γ C_Score , + ∑ γ controls + ε , (6)
where IEi,t is either forecast error, analyst following or volatility of revisions for firm i
and time period t. Following Horton and Serafeim (2010), forecast error is the
absolute error deflated by the closing stock price of the previous year (Cheong and
Thomas, 2011). Analyst following is the number of analysts forecasting earnings per
share for a firm. C_Score is defined as before and calculated from Equation (2).
Controls are control variables suggested by previous literature, including market
value, forecast horizon, earnings surprise, and market return. If the coefficient γ is
significant and positive, information environment and conservatism is positively
correlated, indicating more conservative accounting is associated with a higher level
of information environment.
6. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
I request publicly listed companies geographically located in one of the
European community countries in the WorldScope database. This initial query
yielded 6,171 firms. The accounting and stock return data are from Worldscope and
Datastream. Analysts’ forecast data are from IBES. I delete firms whose accounting
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standards are unknown, firms who are non-IFRS adopters until 2010, firms with
negative market-to-book ratio, and also firms with missing data of the major variables
to test accounting conservatism. The final sample includes 1,954 firms from 19
countries3. The test time period ranges from 2001 to 2010, covering both the pre-
IFRS period and post-IFRS period. I group the sample firms according to countries
and IFRS adoption timing. Table 1 summarizes the results.
Table 1: Sample firms breakdown according to country and IFRS adoption
timing
Country N Early (%) On-time (%) Late (%)
AT: Austria 39 13.99 0.81 0.38
BE: Belgium 65 5.7 3.80 1.33
CZ: Czech Republic 6 1.55 0.24 0
DE: Germany 272 58.55 9.87 7.03
DK: Denmark 88 4.66 4.61 4.18
ES: Spain 78 0.52 6.07 0.38
FI: Finland 71 3.63 4.85 0.76
FR: France 315 1.04 20.06 12.36
GB: United Kingdom 529 0.52 14.89 65.04
GR: Greece 95 0.52 7.44 0.38
HU: Hungary 12 3.63 0.32 0.19
IE: Ireland 29 0 1.46 2.09
IT: Italy 111 0 8.09 2.09
LU: Luxembourg 10 2.07 0.40 0.19
NL: Netherlands 76 1.55 5.50 0.95
PL: Poland 21 0.52 1.54 0.19
PT: Portugal 31 0.52 2.35 0.19
SE: Sweden 106 0.52 7.69 1.90
SK: Slovakia 1 0.52 0 0
Total 1954 100 100 100
Table 1 shows sample firm breakdown according to country and IFRS adoption
timing. The full sample contains 1954 firms from 19 European countries. Firms
adopting IFRS before 2005 are regarded as early adopters; firms adopting IFRS in
2005 are regarded as on-time adopters; firms adopting IFRS after 2005 are regarded
as late adopters.
3 The 19 countries in this study include Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain,
Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Sweden, and Slovakia.
24
Table 1 shows different IFRS adoption patterns across the European countries
included in this paper. Early adopters refer to firms adopting IFRS before 2005; on-
time adopters are regarded as firms adopting IFRS in 2005; late adopters  are firms
adopting IFRS after 2005. Consist with prior studies (e.g., Daske et al. 2008; Piot et al.
2010), more than 50% of IFRS early adopters are Germany firms. Austria firms ranks
second. Conversely, France and United Kingdom seem to simply follow the
requirement. About 35% of on-time adopters are France and United Kingdom firms.
In addition, over 75% of late adopters are from France and United Kingdom. Overall,
the majority firms in my sample are from United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy,
and Sweden. They cover approximately 70% of 1,954 firms.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean StdDev Q1 Median Q3 Min Max
Variables used in calculating Basu coefficient and C_Score
Earnings-Price ratio 0.037 0.485 0.003 0.031 0.078 -0.186 0.124
Return 0.078 0.493 -0.173 0.057 0.267 -0.964 0.340
Size 13.737 2.836 11.600 13.500 15.700 5.050 23.34
M/B 2.980 2.713 2.060 2.477 4.925 0.003 9.678
Lev 1.086 3.439 0.054 0.239 0.852 0.002 4.349
Variables used in information environment model
Forecast error 0.243 2.648 0.005 0.014 0.045 0.000 11.35
Analyst following 50.220 59.781 9 29 71 1 555
Forecast horizon 5.271 0.422 5.176 5.258 5.398 -2.511 6.345
Earnings surprise 0.032 0.520 -0.013 0.001 0.028 -1.547 1.511
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for 19,540 firm-years between 2001 and 2010. The
mean, standard deviation (StdDev), median and first (Q1) and third (Q3) quartiles are
reported. Earnings-Price ratio is calculated as earnings per share (Worldscope item
#05201) divided by price (Worldscope item #05001). Return is the return on each firm
from 9 months before fiscal year-end to three months after fiscal year-end, including
dividend paid and adjusted for stock dividens and capital contributions (Datastream). Size
is the natural log of market value of equity. Market value of equity is calculated as
common shares outstanding (Worldscope item #05301) times price (Worldscope item
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#05001). M/B stands for the market-to-book ratio of common equity based on the closing
price at year end. Lev is leverage, defined as short-term debt (Worldscope item #03051)
and long-term debt (Worldscope item #03251) divided by market value of equity
calculated before.
Forecast error is the absolute error divided by the closing stock price of the previous year.
Analyst following is the natural log of the number of analysts forecasting earnings per
share for a firm. Forecast horizon is defined as the natural log of the number of days
between the forecast’s issue date and the earnings announcement date. Earnings surprise
is defined as the change in earnings per share between two years divided by the closing
stock price of the previous year.
Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics of main variables required to calculate
C_Score for the full sample and test analyst information environment. The mean,
standard deviation, median, first and third quartiles as well as minimum and
maximum numbers are reported. Earnings-Price ratio is calculated as earnings per
share divided by price per share. Mean (median) Earnings-Price ratios are 0.037
(0.031). Return is defined as the return on each firm from 9 months before fiscal year-
end to three months after fiscal year-end, including dividend paid and adjusted for
stock dividends and capital contributions. Mean (median) returns are 0.078 (0.057).
Size is the natural log of market value of equity. Mean (median) sizes are 13.737
(13.500). Market-to-Book ratio is calculated as market value of equity divided by
common equity. Mean (median) Market-to-Book ratios are 2.980 (2.477). Lev is
defined as short-term debt and long-term debt divided by market value of equity.
Mean (median) leverages are 1.086 (0.239).The distributions of these five variables
are similar to those reported in prior literature (e.g. Khan and Watts, 2009). However,
the mean Size is large, suggesting that European firms have large market value of
equity. Size, Market-to-Book, and Lev variables capture firm characteristics that are
widely available and commonly used, as well as four traditional explanations of
accounting conservatism in prior literature4.
The rest of the four variables in Table 2 are used in information environment
model. Forecast error is the absolute error divided by the closing stock price of the
previous year. Mean (median) of forecast error is 0.243 (0.014). The standard
deviation of forecast error is 2.648, suggesting that analysts have quite different views
4 Khan and Watts (2009) present more detailed explanations towards this argument.
26
towards earnings per share for next period. This circumstance might be the result of
unclear future economic trend. Analyst following is the natural log of the number of
the number of analysts forecasting earnings per share. Mean (median) of analyst
following is 50.220 (29). Forecast horizon is defined as the natural log of the number
of days between the forecast’s issue date and the earnings announcement date. Mean
(median) of forecast horizon is 5.271 (5.285). Earnings surprise is the change in
earnings per share between two years deflated by the closing stock price of the
previous year. Mean (median) of earnings surprise is 0.032 (0.001). Except for
Forecast error, the distribution of the rest analyst forecast variables are consistent with
prior literature (Horton and Serafeim, 2010).
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix (Pearson Top; Spearman Bottom)
Earnings-
Price ratio Size M/B Lev
Forecast
Error
Analyst
Following
Forecast
Horizon
Earnings
Surprise
Earnings-Price ratio 1 0.085a -0.038 -0.048a -0.030c 0.034c -0.022c 0.107a
Size 0.070a 1 0.341a -0.045a -0.057a 0.351a 0.091a -0.038b
M/B -0.102a 0.542a 1 -0.247a -0.018 -0.020 0.069a -0.013
Lev 0.029a -0.097a -0.664a 1 0.018c 0.014 0.062 0.025d
Forecast Error -0.021a -0.115a -0.203a 0.060a 1 -0.020b 0.103a 0.012b
Analyst Following 0.087a 0.432a -0.073a 0.037b -0.085a 1 0.113a 0.007
Forecast Horizon -0.086a 0.128a 0.102a -0.092a 0.073d 0.178a 1 0.027b
Earnings Surprise 0.363a -0.045a 0.041b 0.019 0.014 -0.007 0.035b 1
Table 3 shows correlations for 9,237 firm-years between 2001 and 2010. The upper (lower) right triangle of the matrix shows
Pearson (Spearman) correlations. Earnings-Price ratio is calculated as earnings per share (Worldscope item #05201) divided by
price (Worldscope item #05001). Return is the return on each firm from 9 months before fiscal year-end to three months after
fiscal year-end, including dividend paid and adjusted for stock dividends and capital contributions (Datastream). Size is the
natural log of market value of equity. Market value of equity is calculated as common shares outstanding (Worldscope item
#05301) times price (Worldscope item #05001). M/B stands for the market-to-book ratio of common equity based on the closing
price at year end. Lev is leverage, defined as short-term debt (Worldscope item #03051) and long-term debt (Worldscope item
#03251) divided by market value of equity.
Forecast error is the absolute error divided by the closing stock price of the previous year. Analyst following is the natural log of
the number of analysts forecasting earnings per share for a firm. Forecast horizon, earnings surprise, size, and return are control
variables that might affect the analyst variables. Forecast horizon is defined as the natural log of the number of days between the
forecast’s issue date and the earnings announcement date. Earnings surprise is defined as the change in earnings per share
between two years divided by the closing stock price of the previous year.
a, b, c, d denotes two-tailed significance at p inferior to 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.
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Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for variables used in calculating C_Score
and testing information environment, over the period 2001 to 2010. The upper (lower)
right triangle reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlations. Earnings-Price ratio is
positively correlated with Size, but is negatively correlated with Market-to-Book ratio
and Lev. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation between leverage and M/B is -0.247 (-
0.664), consistent with Khan and Watts (2009). Forecast error is negatively correlated
with number of analyst following. Consist with the prior literature (Clement, 1999),
forecast horizon is positively related to forecast error, suggesting the longer the time
between forecast and actual earnings announcement, the higher forecast error.
Earnings surprise exhibits a positive correlation with forecast error and a negative
relationship with number of analysts following.
7. Results
7.1 Accounting conservatism after IFRS adoption
At the top of Table 4, I report the Basu coefficient of each sample. We can see
that Early IFRS adopters have the highest level of accounting conservatism (Basu
coefficient = 1.48, t = 12.49). This result provide evidence that firms become less
conservative after IFRS adoption, no matter early, on-time, or late adopters.
Then, I calculate C_Score, which represent the level of accounting
conservatism, for each firm. To do so, I estimate the Fama-Mecbeth regression in
Equation (1) annually and, then, summarize the mean coefficients over the 10 years in
Table 4. After getting the coefficients, I calculate the C_Score for a firm-year as
given in Equation (2), using coefficients in Table 4.
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Table 4: Mean Coefficients from Estimation Regression of Equation (1) and (3)
(Dependent Variable is calculated by extracting data from Worldscope)
Pooled Early On-time Late
Basu Coefficient 0.82880
(30.89)a
1.48116
(12.49)a
0.99491
(28.43)a
0.22994
(6.77)a
Intercept 0.093 (4.04)b -0.084 (-1.46) 0.060 (1.98)d 0.057 (1.11)d
D 0.261 (2.39)c 0.320 (1.58)c 0.252 (4.26)b 0.131 (0.84)
R 0.030 (2.71)c 0.109 (0.99) 0.078 (3.99)b 0.038 (3.49)a
R x Size 0.012 (4.01)a 0.008 (1.20) 0.004 (0.66) 0.006 (1.56)d
R x M/B -0.003 (-1.31) 0.039 (0.60) -0.001 (-1.12) -0.002 (-0.57)
R x Lev 0.021 (0.43) 0.127 (1.08) 0.018 (0.81) -0.051 (-0.46)
D x R 2.747 (11.79)a 1.566 (8.30)a 3.174 (15.95)a 0.562 (7.03)a
D x R x Size -0.164 (-9.06)a -0.106 (-7.53)a -0.203 (-15.05)a -0.057 (-1.67)d
D x R x M/B -0.004 (-2.08) -0.249 (-4.04)c -0.001 (0.19) -0.002 (-0.52)
D x R x Lev 0.101 (1.94)d 0.459 (5.20)b 0.125 (5.80)a 0.336 (2.35)c
Size 0.003 (2.18) 0.009 (2.72) 0.001 (0.07) -0.003 (-1.05)
M/B -0.038 (-2.48)b -0.003 (-0.56) -0.0013 (-4.06)a 0.003 (0.10)
Lev 0.006 (0.70) -0.013 (-9.25)a -0.009 (-2.42)c 0.089 (5.20)a
D x Size -0.016 (2.16)c -0.026 (-1.44) -0.017 (-2.79)b -0.012 (-4.52)a
D x M/B 0.005 (1.33) -0.055 (-1.30)d 0.004 (0.51) -0.002 (-1.97)c
D x Lev 0.095 (3.03)c 0.163 (1.16) 0.032 (1.62)d 0.075 (8.47)a
Number of
Observation 19,029 1901 12107 5021
C_Score 0.568519 0.951888 0.597556 0.355085
Table 4 shows mean coefficients from annual Fama-Macbeth regressions of the
following model, on a sample of 19,540 firm-years from 2001 to 2010.
, / , = + , + , ( + , + / , + , ) +, , ( + , + / , + , ) + ( , + / , +, + , + , / , + , , ) + , (1), / , = + , + , + , , + , (3)
D is a dummy variable equal to 1 if returns are negative and 0 elsewhere. Size is the
natural log of market value of equity. Market value of equity is calculated as common
shares outstanding (Worldscope item #05301) times price (Worldscope item #05001).
M/B stands for the market-to- book ratio of common equity based on the closing price
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at year end. Lev is leverage, defined as short-term debt (Worldscope item #03051)
and long-term debt (Worldscope item #03251) divided by market value of equity
calculated before.The coefficients estimates in the table are used to calculate
C_Score.
Firms adopting IFRS before 2005 are regarded as early adopters; firms adopting IFRS
in 2005 are regarded as on-time adopters; firms adopting IFRS after 2005 are
regarded as late adopters; Firms that use accounting standards other than IFRS in
2010, such as local standards, International standards, or U.S. GAAP, are regarded as
non-adopters.
T-statistics are in the brackets. a, b, c, d denotes two-tailed significance at p inferior
to 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.
Table 4 shows the mean coefficients from estimation regression of Equation (1) and
(3). The first column reports coefficients from full pooled sample. The rest are over
several sample breakdowns according to IFRS adoption timing: Early, On-time, and
Late. In both pooled and breakdown samples, earnings and returns, which are
represented by coefficients of R and DxR, are significantly positive, suggesting both
good news and bad news will be reflected in earnings. This result is consistent with
that in Basu (1997). The positive coefficient of DxR indicates that firms are
conservative on average. In addition, the coefficients of DxRxSize are significantly
negative. Consistent with previous studies (Giner and Rees, 2001; Basu, 2001), this
result means that larger firms are more likely to have lower level of accounting
conservatism. The coefficients of DxRxLev are significantly positive, consistent with
the idea that more levered firms have higher level of accounting conservatism (Basu
et al., 2001, Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Beaver and Ryan, 2009). However, the signs
of DxRxM/B are mixed across pooled and breakdown samples. Also, the coefficients
of DxRxM/B are insignificant. These results are likely due to the buffer problem
which has been mentioned in previous section. The mean coefficients of DxR,
DxRxSize, DxRxM/B5, and DxRxLev are used to calculate C_Score in Equation (2).
At the bottom of Table 4, I report the average C_Score of each sample. We can
see that Early IFRS adopters have the highest level of accounting conservatism
(C_Score = 0.9518). This result provides the same evidence as Basu coefficients.
5 Even though the coefficient of DxRxM/B is insignificant, this result is consistent with Khan and
Watts (2009).
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One concern of using C_Score to measure accounting conservatism is worth
noting. Khan and Watts (2009) caution that C_Score may not be appropriate to proxy
for accounting conservatism in countries or regions other than U.S. because of the
different institutional features. Therefore, I rank the firms according to their C_Score
and divide them into three groups, representing three level of accounting
conservatism (low, medium, and high). Then, I run Basu (1997) returns-based
asymmetric timeliness model for each group.
Table 5: Coefficients from Basu (1997) regressions by high, medium, and low
C_Score groups
C_Score Group Intercept D R D x R
G1 (Low) 0.0275
(10.33)
0.0542
(2.97)
0.0032
(1.16)
0.0912
(10.33)a
G2 (Medium) 0.0602
(1.54)
0.0086
(1.85)
0.1033
(7.57)
0.2300
(14.35)a
G3 (High) 0.0592
(3.96)
0.1697
(6.41)
0.1608
(8.52)
1.4483
(22.49)a
High-Low 1.3571
Table 5 examines the validity of C_Score in distinguishing different level of
accounting conservatism by detecting the trend of coefficients in Basu (1997) model.
Firms are first classified into three equal-size groups by C_Score, and, then, I
estimate the following regression for each group:
Basu (1997) model: , / , = + , + , + , , + ,
X is earnings per share; P is year-end stock price per share. X/P ratio here is
calculated as earnings per share (Worldscope item #05201) divided by price
(Worldscope item #05001). Return is the return on each firm from 9 months before
fiscal year-end to three months after fiscal year-end, including dividend paid and
adjusted for stock dividens and capital contributions (Datastream); D is a dummy
variable which equals 1 if R is negative and 0 elsewhere.
Table 5 examines the validity of C_Score in distinguishing different level of
accounting conservatism by detecting the trend of coefficients in Basu (1997) model.
The coefficients DxR increase across the three groups from 0.0912 (t=10.33) to
1.4483 (t=22.49). This result is consistent with the trend of changing accounting
conservatism ranked by C_Score. The difference between high and low C_Score
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group is 1.3571. Consequently, the C_Score measure of accounting conservatism is
effective in distinguish EU firms, because of the same trend of changing Basu
coefficients.
After checking the validity of C_Score, I sort the firms by years and average the
C_Score of all the firms. Also, I run Basu (1997) model of each year. Finally, it
comes up with 10 averages C_Score and 10 Basu coefficients from 2001 to 2010.
Table 6: Comparison of C_Score and Basu Coefficient per year (pooled)
Year C_Scoret Basu Coefficient
2001 0.603121 1.15406
(11.68)a
2002 0.679558 1.58523
(8.02)a
2003 0.481594 0.93303
(14.67)a
2004 0.568708 0.87609
(8.10)a
2005 0.519725 0.69996
(3.78)b
2006 0.464116 0.56895
(7.05)a
2007 0.446740 0.61411
(6.57)a
2008 0.720247 0.97395
(3.50)b
2009 0.602386 1.08375
(14.73)a
2010 0.598613 1.16825
(16.11)a
Table 6 compares the changing trend of C_Score and Basu Coefficient according to
years. C_Score for firm i in year t is calculated by taking coefficients of DxR,
DxRxSize, DxRxM/B, and DxRxLev in Table 3 into the following equation._ , = + , + ⁄ , + , (2)
Then, I group them by year and get the average of C_Score for each year which is
presented in above table.   Basu coefficients per year are calculated using Basu (1997)
for each group.
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Table 6 compares the changing trend of Basu coefficient and C_Score
according to years. From 2002 to 2005, both Basu coefficient and C_Score are
decreasing. After mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005, the level of accounting
conservatism of European firms continues decrease, reaching the lowest level before
2008 (Basu coefficient = 0.56895, t=7.05; C_Score = 0.4467). However, in 2008, the
conservatism climbs to the high level (Basu coefficient = 0.9739, t=3.50; C_Score =
0.7202), likely due to the global economic crisis. Firms are experiencing hard time
during 2008 and it seems that they prefer conservative accounting to provide more
credit on their current performance and ease the concern of debtholders. After the
economic crisis, the level of accounting conservatism falls, but still higher than levels
before 2008.
Plotting the Basu coefficient and C_Score in Table 6, I get Figure 1.
Figure 1: Conservatism Plot (pooled)
Figure 1 shows the changing of accounting conservatism which is represented
by Basu coefficient and C_Score across time. Overall, the trend of C_Score is
consistent with that of Basu coefficients. However, Basu coefficients are more
volatile, ranging from 1.58 in year 2002 to 0.56 in year 2006. In summary, results in
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Table 6 and Figure 1 indicate that the accounting conservatism decreases after IFRS
adoption, supporting hypothesis 1b.
Furthermore, using the coefficients in Table 7, I plot the good news versus bad
news across year. The result is shown in Figure 2.
Table 7: Coefficients of Basu (1997) model across year (pooled)
Year β2 (Good News) β3 (Difference) β2 + β3 (Bad News)
2001 -0.013
(-0.02)
1.15406
(11.68)a
1.14106
2002 -0.164
(-3.99)a
1.58523
(8.02)a
1.42123
2003 0.015
(2.74)a
0.93303
(14.67)a
0.94802
2004 0.011
(4.94)a
0.87609
(8.10)a
0.88709
2005 0.126
(3.78)a
0.69996
(3.78)b
0.82596
2006 0.197
(1.76)c
0.56895
(7.05)a
0.76595
2007 -0.028
(-0.81)
0.61411
(6.57)a
0.58611
2008 0.002
(0.01)
0.97395
(3.50)b
0.97595
2009 -0.003
(-0.17)
1.08375
(14.73)a
1.08075
2010 0.003
(0.13)
1.16825
(16.11)a
1.17125
Table 7 shows the coefficients of R and DxR in Basu (1997) model from 2001 to
2010.
Basu (1997) model: , / , = + , + , + , , + ,
X is earnings per share; P is year-end stock price per share. X/P ratio here is
calculated as earnings per share (Worldscope item #05201) divided by price
(Worldscope item #05001). Return is the return on each firm from 9 months before
fiscal year-end to three months after fiscal year-end, including dividend paid and
adjusted for stock dividens and capital contributions (Datastream); D is a dummy
variable which equals 1 if R is negative and 0 elsewhere.
35
Figure 2: Good news versus Bad news Plot (pooled)
Figure 2 shows the change of good news and bad news from 2001 to 2010.
Good news is represented by the coefficient of R, which is β2 in the Basu (1997)
model. Bad news is the sum of coefficients of R and DxR, which is the sum of β2 and
β3. General, the good news and bad news present an opposite trend. This indicates
that if there is an increase in the earnings reflecting good news, there will be a
corresponding decrease in the earnings reflecting bad news. This result is consistent
with that in Basu (1997) who plot the good news against bad news from 1964 to 1989.
From 2001 to 2010, there is a big difference between the coefficient on good news
and bad news. However, after mandatory IFRS adoption, the difference seems to be
reduced. Nevertheless, the difference enlarges again after 2008. The opposite trend
between good news and bad news become vague. This might because of the
insignificant coefficients of R in Table 7.
In addition, I compare the Basu coefficient for three subsamples: early, on-time,
and late IFRS adopters. Table 8 shows the Basu coefficients for each group across
year.
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Table 8: Basu coefficients for Early, On-time, and Late IFRS adopters
Year Early On-time Late
2001 0.7324
(4.15)a
0.5855
(6.73)a
0.2538
(4.83)a
2002 3.6944
(3.76)b
1.0831
(7.85)a
0.1399
(1.03)
2003 0.8010
(4.11)a
0.9883
(11.19)a
0.9168
(9.99)a
2004 2.888
(3.82)b
0.7389
(7.46)a
0.5859
(3.12)b
2005 1.1994
(6.56)a
0.6364
(4.81)a
0.0429
(0.75)
2006 0.3995
(1.66)
1.0366
(9.30)a
0.1309
(2.24)d
2007 0.3609
(2.78)c
0.9149
(15.53)a
0.1813
(0.6)
2008 0.8479
(1.07)
1.3009
(1.47)
0.2288
(1.74)
2009 1.5007
(6.55)a
1.2778
(12.59)a
0.5290
(5.27)a
2010 0.4292
(1.47)
2.1042
(15.91)a
0.0107
(0.14)
Table 8 shows the coefficient of DxR in Basu (1997) model from 2001 to 2010.
Basu (1997) model: , / , = + , + , + , , + ,
X is earnings per share; P is year-end stock price per share. X/P ratio here is
calculated as earnings per share (Worldscope item #05201) divided by price
(Worldscope item #05001). Return is the return on each firm from 9 months before
fiscal year-end to three months after fiscal year-end, including dividend paid and
adjusted for stock dividens and capital contributions (Datastream); D is a dummy
variable which equals 1 if R is negative and 0 elsewhere.
Figure 3 shows the conservatism plot measured by Basu coefficient of early,
on-time, and late IFRS adopters. The level of accounting conservatism for early IFRS
adopters changes sharply before 2005, from 0.7324 in 2001 to 3.6944 in 2002, then,
back to 0.8010 in 2003. The level of accounting conservatism of on-time IFRS
adopters remains in a relatively low level and fluctuate between 0.5 to 1.5. Late IFRS
adopters have the lowest the level of accounting conservatism among three groups.
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Figure 3: Conservatism Plot of Early, On-time, and Late IFRS adopters
7.2   Accounting conservatism and Information asymmetry
Table 9: Mean Coefficients from Estimation Regression of Equation (4) and (5)
(Dependent Variable is calculated by extracting data from Worldscope)
Equation (4) Equation (5)
Intercept 0.057 (2.08)c -0.181 (0.19)
D 0.143 (1.97) -1.418 (-3.69)a
R 0.259 (4.31)b 0.104 (1.63)d
D x R 0.503 (6.56)a 0.752 (1.11)
B/A -0.015 (-1.74) -0.472 (-0.95)
B/A x D -0.056 (-0.74) 1.036 (1.92)c
B/A x R 0.211 (2.34)c 0.423 (7.05)a
B/A x D x R 0.397 (9.45)a 0.886 (8.32)a
IFRS -0.139 (-1.76)
IFRS x D 1.556 (4.33)a
IFRS x R -0.821 (-2.82)c
IFRS x D x R 0.661 (1.12)
IFRS x B/A 0.473 (1.38)d
IFRS x B/A x D -0.725 (-1.40)
IFRS x B/A x R -0.403 (-1.96)d
IFRS x B/A x D x R -0.840 (-5.21)a
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Table 7 shows mean coefficients from annual Fama-Macbeth regressions of the
following model, on a sample of 6,665 firm-years from 2001 to 2010.
, ,⁄ = + , + , + , , + ⁄ , + ⁄ , ,+ ⁄ , , + ⁄ , , , + , (4), ,⁄ = + , + , + , , + ⁄ , + ⁄ , ,+ ⁄ , , + ⁄ , , , + , + , , +, , + , , , + , ⁄ , +, ⁄ , , + , ⁄ , , +, ⁄ , , , + , (5)
Bid-ask spread is the average of the daily spread as the difference between bid price
and ask price for that firm-year and, then, scaled by the midpoint of the spread. Other
variables are same as before.
Table 7 shows mean coefficients from estimation regression of Equation (4) and
(5). The results show that the relationship between accounting conservatism and
information asymmetry is significantly positive, consistent with LaFond and Watts
(2008). The coefficient of IFRSxB/AxDxR is negative (-0.840), while the coefficient
of B/AxDxR is positive (0.886). This result indicates that the adoption of IFRS will
weaken the relationship between information asymmetry and conservatism. This
means people might turn to other information sources to make up for the loss of
accounting credibility, threatening the role of accounting as an information source.
Therefore, blindly lowering the level of accounting conservatism might not weaken
the role of accounting. Consistent with Basu (1997), the coefficients of R and DxR
are positive. However, the coefficient of DxR in Equation (5) is not significant. It is
probably because other interactive variables with DxR soak up the effect of DxR.
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7.3 Accounting conservatism and Information Environment
Table 10: Mean Coefficients from Estimation Regression of Equation (6)
(Dependent Variable is calculated by extracting data from IBES)
Forecast Error Number of Analysts
Indep. Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Intercept 0.923 (5.11)a -2.134 (-10.93)a
C_Score 0.064 (1.22) 1.910 (9.87)a
Forecast Horizon 0.134 (12.78)a 0.036 (8.39)a
Earnings Surprise 0.438 (3.21)b 1.352 (1.68)d
Size -0.197 (-9.02)a 5.812 (20.43)a
Return -0.516 (-4.55)a -5.933 (-7.88)a
Table 8 shows mean coefficients from OLS regressions of the following model, on a
sample of 9,237 firm-years from 2001 to 2010. The data used to calculate C_Score is
extracted from Worldscope and Datastream. Other data for analysts’ information
environment is from IBES.
, = + _ , + , + , +, + , + , (6)
IEi,t is either forecast error or analyst following. The definition of these variables
follows Horton and Serafeim (2010). Forecast error is the absolute error divided by
the closing stock price of the previous year. Analyst following is the natural log of the
number of analysts forecasting earnings per share for a firm. Forecast horizon,
earnings surprise, size, and return are control variables that might affect the analyst
variables. Forecast horizon is defined as the natural log of the number of days
between the forecast’s issue date and the earnings announcement date. Earnings
surprise is defined as the change in earnings per share between two years divided by
the closing stock price of the previous year. Size is the natural log of market value of
equity. Return is the return on each firm from 9 months before fiscal year-end to three
months after fiscal year-end, including dividend paid and adjusted for stock dividends
and capital contributions.
Table 8 shows mean coefficients from estimation regression of Equation (6).
The relationship between C_Score and forecast error is insignificant, even though
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they are positive. This result indicates that there is only negligible effect of lowering
accounting conservatism in order to increase forecast accuracy and information
environment, supporting the argument that trying to reduce information asymmetry
by decreasing the level of accounting conservatism might not be achieved, because it
is information asymmetry leads to accounting conservatism. The relationship between
C_Score and the number of analysts following is significantly positive (C_Score =
1.910, t=9.87), suggesting that the higher level of accounting conservatism, the more
analysts following. This result supports the argument that conservative accounting
can provide hard information on firms’ current performance for uninformed investors
and also serve as benchmark for other soft information, such as management.
Therefore, firms with higher level of accounting conservatism attract more analysts,
because analysts believe their information is more credible. Consequently, even
though accounting cannot solve the problem of reducing information asymmetry by
providing unverifiable information, conservative accounting increases information
environment by providing comparatively credible information.
The rest are control variables. The coefficients of forecast horizon are
significantly positive for both forecast error and the number of analyst following,
consist with argument that the longer the time between forecast and actual
announcement, the higher forecast error and more analysts following. Earnings
surprise is positively correlated with forecast error and the number of analysts. Size is
negatively related with forecast error, but positively related with the number of
analysts, consist with the idea that larger firms have better information environments.
Return is negatively associated with forecast error and the number of analyst
followings. All these four control variables are consistent with results in prior study
(e.g., Horton and Serafeim, 2010).
8. Conclusions
This study investigates how accounting conservatism changes after mandatory
IFRS adoption. Accounting conservatism will decrease if investors expect higher
financial reporting quality after mandatory IFRS adoption, more financial reporting
41
transparency, and lower information asymmetry. However, accounting conservatism
will increase if investors expect accounting numbers to be less verifiable and turn to
other information sources. In order to maintain the financial reporting as a role of
information source, firms will tend to enhance the level of accounting conservatism
and, thus, increasing credibility of financial reports. The empirical findings of this
study shows that the level of accounting conservatism decreases after mandatory
IFRS adoption and reached the lowest point before 2008. However, in 2008,
accounting conservatism sharply increased, likely due to the global economic crisis.
This supports the idea that the enhancement of accounting conservatism is an efficient
mechanism to increase information credibility, even though investors expect higher
reporting quality after mandatory IFRS adoption.
Moreover, this study shows that information asymmetry is positively related to
accounting conservatism, consist with LaFond and Watts (2008), and the adoption of
IFRS will weaken the relationship between them. People would turn to other
information sources after the adoption of IFRS which is a allegedly principle-based
accounting standard. This might be because IFRS lowers the level of accounting
conservatism and, therefore, lower the credibility of accounting, threatening the role
of accounting as an information source. Consequently, it is better to maintain
accounting conservatism to some level instead of blindly lowering it (Ball, 2006;
Watts, 2003; Basu and Waymire, 2010).
Finally, this study examines the relationship between accounting conservatism
and information environment, since LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that the higher
level of accounting conservatism can generate a more informed capital market.
Consistent with their argument, this study shows that conservative accounting
increases information environment by providing comparatively credible information,
because there is a significant positive relationship between conservatism and analysts
following. Moreover, empirical findings also support the implications in LaFond and
Watts (2008) paper that there is only negligible effect when trying to reduce forecast
error by lowering the level of accounting conservatism.
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